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Introduction
The intense competition and rivalry of international trade have prompted
nations to increasingly protect themselves by adopting defensive measures.
This concern has recently preoccupied the European Economic Com-
munity's (EEC) different institutions' which in particular are under the pres-
sure of an increasingly large number of dumping complaints from EEC in-
dustrial associations who feel they are suffering from distorted competnion.
Another important development relevant to this problem are the first deci-
sions handed down by the Court of Justice of the European Community
(hereinafter, the Court) on this subject on March 29, 1979.2
Most of the defensive measures taken by the nations' parties in response to
the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) are supposed to be in
line with the principles contained either in the agreement itself or in the modi-
fications to it. The same is the case for the EEC dumping rules principally
contained in EEC Regulation 459/68 of April 5, 1968,' which have been
recently modified in EEC Regulation 1681/79 of August 1, 1979.' The later
*Mr. De Smedt is a practicing member of the Brussels Bar.
tEDITOR's NOTE: This article was prepared in the fall of 1979. An EEC Regulation on the same
subject was released on December 20, 1979. A paper is under preparation to discuss the major
provisions contained in this regulation and will appear in one of the next issues.
'See, e.g., the European Parliament Resolution of May 8, 1978, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 108/
23) - (1978), urging the Commission to, inter alia, achieve the following aim in the Tokyo round
of the multilateral trade negotiations:" . . . in the field of safeguarding action against dumping
and subsidies under Article VI (of the GATT): to eliminate the existing discrepancies between
the practices of States, thereby equalizing the obligations and rights of all GATT members."
'NTN Toyo Bearing Co. v. Council, Case No. 113/77; Import Standard Office S.A. v. Coun-
cil, Case No. 118/77; Nippon Seiko K.K. v. Council, Case No. 119/77; Toyo Seiko Co. v.
Council, Case No. 120/77; Nachi Fujikoshi Co. v. Council, Case No. 121/77 (not yet reported)
[hereinafter cited as the Japanese Roller Bearings Case].
I I O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 93) 1 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Reg. 459/68].
'22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 196) 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Reg. 1681/79].
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modification has resulted principally from the need to clarify several con-
cepts contained in Regulation 459/68 which proved to be inconsistent or
imprecise in their application and also because of the Court's first rulings on
the subject.
Regulation 459/68 provides that antidumping duties will be imposed
whenever an investigation into a particular case demonstrates: (1) that dump-
ing or subsidization is or has been taking place; (2) that such dumping or
subsidization is causing or threatening to cause material injury to an es-
tablished EEC industry or is materially retarding the establishment of an
EEC industry; and (3) that the interest of the EEC calls for immediate inter-
vention.I
This rule applies to all products imported from non-EEC countries.' This
implies that the dumping regulations can have a cumulative effect with spe-
cific provisions applicable to certain products such as agricultural products,
although, until now, no dumping procedure has involved imports of agri-
cultural products. With respect to products covered by the European Coal
and Steel Community Treaty of 1952, the Commission has taken special
protective measures against dumping which are very similar to the provisions
contained in Regulation 459/68.1
I. The New Definitions under Regulation 1681/79
A. Dumping
Regulation 1681/79 has introduced a number of clarifications and new
definitions, principally with respect to the concept of dumping. It provides
that a product shall be considered to have been dumped if its export price to
the EEC is below the normal value of the like product.'
B. Normal Value
The general rule to be followed in determining the "normal value" is to
refer to the comparable price actually paid or payable in the ordinary course
of trade for the like product intended for consumption in the exporting coun-
try of origin.' There are two cases where this general rule will not apply
because the necessary comparison is rendered difficult or biased:
'Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 15, § l(a).
'Id., art. 1, § 3.
'Commission Recommendation No. 77/329/ECSC, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 114) 6
(1977), asmodifiedby Recommendation No. 3004/77/ECSC, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 352)
13 (1977).
'Reg. 1681/79, supra note 4, art. 1 (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 3, § 1).
'Reg. 1681/79, supra note 4, art. 1 (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 3, § 2 (a) (aa)).
On the question of the meaning of "in the ordinary course of trade" and whether persistent
selling at a loss could be considered to be "in the ordinary course of trade," see the opinion of
Mr. Advocate General J.-P. Warner in the Japanese Roller Bearings Case, Case No. 121/77 (not
yet reported). See also Part IC infra.
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1. when there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of
trade on the domestic market or in the exporting country;
2. when, because of the particular market situation, such sales do not
permit a proper comparison.
In such cases, the normal value will be determined by the price of the like
product when exported to any third country. Although the Commission has
almost never used this method so far, the chosen exporting price to a third
country may be the highest alternative provided that it is representative.II In
the two alternatives where no valid comparison on the domestic market is
possible, the Commission may also choose to use the constructed value. For
various reasons, this method has been frequently used by the Commission.I
The constructed value is determined as being the cost of production. This
includes the overhead costs in the country of origin plus a reasonable profit
margin. Usually the profit is determined by comparison with the profit nor-
mally realized on the sales of products of the same general category in the
domestic market of the country of origin. If such a reference is unavailable,
the profit margin to be added to the cost of production will be left to the
Commission's discretion and will be based upon the "available informa-
tion.',,2
C. Normal Commercial Transaction
Regulation 1681/79 offers as an example of a situation in which sales can
be considered as not having been effected in the course of a normal commer-
cial transaction or "in the ordinary course of trade" in the country of origin,
the case where a product is sold at a lower price than the production cost. If
the Commission believes or suspects that sales in the country of origin have
taken place, "in substantial quantities," at prices below the cost of produc-
tion, without any chance of recovery of the cost in the normal course of trade
and within a reasonable period of time, and if such situation has continued
during an "extended period of time," then the Commission will have the
choice of assessing the normal value in one of four ways:
1. by referring to the remaining sales on the domestic market at a price
which is not less than the cost of production;
2. by referring to the export sales to third countries;
'Reg. 1681/79, supra note 4, art. I (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 3, § 2 (a) (bb)
(i) ).
"In the case of bicycle chains originating in Taiwan, the reason was the particular situation on
the Taiwan market. Council Regulation No. 316/77, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 45) 41 (1977).
In the case of ferrochromium, the reason was the disproportion between the sale volume which
represented a small portion of the total turnover. Council Regulation No. 1355/78, 21 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 165) - (1978). The same method was also used in the case of roller bearings
originating in Japan. Council Regulation No. 1778/77, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 196) i
(1977).
"Reg. 1681/79, supra note 4, art. I (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 3, § 2 (a) (bb)
(ii) ).
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3. by referring to the constructed value; or
4. by adjusting the price below cost of production in order to eliminate
loss and to provide for a reasonable profit' 3
D. State Trading Countries
In the case of imports from state trading countries, the EEC has now
codified the method used previously: '4 the normal value will be determined
on the basis of the price at which a similar product is actually sold for con-
sumption in a market economy country or actually sold by such country to
other countries, including those of the EEC." If more appropriate, the Com-
mission can use the constructed value of the similar product in a market
economy country. 6 A third alternative is available when neither the price nor
the constructed value is available: the price actually paid or payable in the
EEC for the like product, duly adjusted if necessary to ensure a reasonable
profit margin."
E. Intermediate Country
Should a product not be imported directly from the country of origin to the
EEC but from an intermediate country, then the Commission will consider
the normal value as being the price paid for a similar product on the domestic
market of either the country of origin or the intermediate country. The price
being paid on the domestic market in the country of origin for the similar
product will be used for comparison, when the product is either merely trans-
shipped through the intermediate country (where it is not produced), or when
no comparable price exists in such a country.
F. Export Price
The normal value will then be compared to the export price. The export
price is deemed to be the price actually paid or payable for the product sold
for export to the EEC.'9 However, there are two exceptions to this general
rule:
1. when there is no such export price;
2. when it appears that there is an association or a compensatory arrange-
ment between the exporter and the importer or a third party.
The Commission relied on this second form of what is generally under-
"Reg. 1681/79, supra note 4 , art. I (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 4, art. 3, § 2 (b)).
"See, e.g., Council Regulation No. 322/79 of February 16, 1979, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 44) ._ (1979) (imposing a provisional antidumping duty on herbicides orginating in Rumania).
" 'Reg. 1681/79, supra note 4, art. 1 (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 3, § 2 (c) (aa)).
"Reg. 1681/79, supra note 4, art. I (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 3, § 2 (c) (bb)).
'Reg. 1681/79, supra note 4, art. I (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 3, § 2 (c) (cc)).
"Reg. 1681/79, supra note 4, art. I (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 3, § 2 (d)).
'Reg. 1681/79, supra note 4, art. I (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 3, § 3 (a)).
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stood as "occult" dumping in the Japanese Roller Bearings Case"° because,
inter alia, of the existence of a mere exclusive distribution agreement. This
position was attacked when the case came before the European Court of
Justice, Mr. Advocate General J.-P. Warner arguing that a distribution rela-
tionship could not as such constitute an association within the concept of
occult dumping."2
In these two forms of occult dumping, the export price will be constructed
on the basis of the price at which the product is first resold to an independent
purchaser, with an adjustment for selling costs and profit between the im-
porter and buyer.
The same constructed export price will apply if the product is not resold to
an independent buyer, or is reconditioned before resale. In this case, the
constructed value will be established on any "reasonable basis," subject to
the usual adjustment for selling costs and profit.
This adjustment will include:
1. the usual transport, insurance, handling, loading and related costs;
2. the customs duties, any antidumping duty and other taxes payable in
the importing country by reason of the importation or sale of the prod-
ucts;
3. a reasonable margin for overheads and profit and/or any usual com-
mission.2
For comparability purposes, the prices must be at the same commercial
level, which in principle is the ex-factory price, and "the dates should be as
close as possible." 3 Regulation 1681/79 does not clarify this vague require-
ment, leaving wide discretion to the EEC authorities.2 1
G. Due Allowances
The EEC has, however, greatly developed the concept of "due allow-
ances" for differences in conditions and terms of sale which may affect price
comparability.
Regulation 1681/79 gives some indication of the allowances which may be
taken into consideration for differences in circumstances of sale. It is to be
noted that the burden of proof on such differences will lie with the person
who asserts them."
By and large, there are three categories of allowances: differences in
(1) merchandise, (2) quantities and (3) conditions and terms of sale.
The effect of differences in merchandise on the market value in the country
of origin or export will be examined. If the necessary elements are not avail-
20Nachi Fujikoshi Co. v. Council, Case No. 121/77 (not yet reported).
Id. (opinion of Mr. Advocate General J.-P. Warner).
2 Reg. 1681/79, supra note 4, art. I (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 3, § 3 (b)).
2 Reg. 1681/79, supra note 4, art. I (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 3, § 4 (a)).2
'Van Bael, The EEC Antidumping Rules, 12 INT'L LAW. 523, 527 (1978).
2 Reg. 1681/79, supra note 4, art. I (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 3, § 4 (b)).
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able or do not permit a fair comparison, the effect of differences in merchan-
dise will be calculated from the different production costs of the elements
that make such differences.2"
Differences in price due to variation in quantities will be accepted if such
differences result from price discounts for quantity sales on the domestic
market. To qualify, such discounts must have been freely granted "in the
normal course of trade" over a period of at least six months and for at least
twenty percent of the total sale of the product in the domestic market or,
alternatively, in a third country market. 7 Differences in price due to quanti-
ties may also result from savings in the cost of producing different quanti-
ties.2" There is one limitation in the allowances for differences in quantities:
when the export price is calculated with reference to export quantities which
are less than the smallest quantity sold on the domestic market, then the
higher price for such small quantity on the domestic market will be taken into
consideration for the allowances.
29
In order to be taken into account, the differences in conditions and terms
of sale must bear a direct relationship to the litigious sales. These will include,
inter alia, differences in credit terms, guarantees, warranties, technical assis-
tance, servicing and commissions. The amount of such differences will be
determined normally by reference to their cost to the seller or exporter, and
rarely in terms of the component of the product value."0
On a question which has given rise to much controversy, 3' Regulation
1681/79 expressly provides that, in accordance with the GATT principles,
imported products which have received an exemption from an indirect tax in
the export country will not be considered to have been dumped in the Com-
mon Market. 2
'Reg. 1681/79, supra note 4, art. I (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 3, § 4 (b) (aa)).
"Reg. 1681/79, supra note 4, art. 1 (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 3, § 4 (b) (bb)
(i) ).
'Reg. 1681/79, supra note 4, art. I (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 3, § 4 (b) (bb)
(ii) ).
"Reg. 1681/79, supra note 4, art. 1 (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 3, § 4 (b) (bb)).
'Reg. 1681/79, supra note 4, art. 1 (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 3, § 4 (b) (cc)).
"In Zenith Radio Corporation v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 2441 (1978), the United States
Supreme Court ruled on June 21, 1978 that Japan's practice of exempting her exports from
commodity taxes did not require the Treasury Department to impose countervailing duties. The
United States Treasury Department had traditionally taken the view that tax concessions of this
sort did not qualify as an export "bounty" or "grant" which, under United States legislation,
requires the imposition of countervailing duties. The United States Supreme Court decision
upheld the reversal of a decision of the United States Customs Court requiring the United States
to impose a countervailing duty on Japanese electronic products which had received an exemp-
tion from commodity taxes in Japan. The significance of the Supreme Court decision extended
beyond the Zenith case itself. Had the decision gone the other way, challenges to the European
practice of rebating value added taxes with respect to exports would have been certain. One such
challenge brought by the United States Steel Company was pending in the lower courts when the
Supreme Court ruled.
"Reg. 1681/79, supra note 4, art. I (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 3, § 4 (c)).
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H. Dumping Margin
According to the GATT requirements, any antidumping duty may not be
greater in amount than the margin of dumping.33 Regulation 459/68 had
already confirmed this principle.34 Regulation 1681/79 further defines the
notion of "dumping margin." The margin of dumping is the difference be-
tween the normal value and the export price. Difficulty may arise when prices
vary. In that case, the Commission is entitled to establish the dumping
margin on a transaction-by-transaction basis or by reference to weighted35 or
representative 6 average prices.
When there is a variation in the dumping margins, the Commission will
rely on the average margin.17
II. Determination of Injury
Dumping must cause or threaten to cause material injury to an established
community industry or materially retard the setting up of an industry whose
establishment in the EEC is envisaged.38 The new rules do not change this
basic concept of material injury. The injury caused by factors other than
dumping must be isolated; no injury can be attributed to dumping if the latter
is not manifestly the main cause of it. When considering the factors other
than dumping which might have an adverse effect on the EEC industry, the
consequences of proven dumping are compared with these other factors in
order to determine if dumping is the principal cause of injury.39 These other
factors include the volume and prices of other imports of the product in
question, competition between the EEC producers themselves or the contrac-
tion in demand which is caused, inter alia, by the substitution of other prod-
ucts, the changes in consumer tastes or the variation in export trade.40
"General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Oct. 30, 1947, Art. VI, § 2.61 Stat. (5) and
(6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700.
3
'Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 19, § 3.
"Concerning the method of weighted average prices, see the opinion of Mr. Advocate General
J.-P. Warner in the Japanese Roller Bearings Case, Case No. 121/77 (not yet reported):
... the prices used by the Commission for the purposes of its calculation were, both in the
case of export prices and in the case of domestic prices, weighted average prices, in other words
for each product an average was calculated by dividing the total amount obtained on sales by
the total amount of units sold. This method was chosen because there were considerable price
variations on individual transactions even in respect to the same product from the same sup-
plier.
6When there is a very large number of different types of the litigious product being sold in the
EEC, it is impracticable to calculate dumping margins for all of them and the calculation is done
therefore for the representative types only. This was the method adopted in the Japanese Roller
Bearings Case, Case No. 121/77 (not yet reported).
"Reg. 1681/79, supra note 4, art. 1 (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 3, § 5).
'Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 2, § 1.
"Reg. 1681/79, supra note 4, art. 2 (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 4, § 3 (a)).
"Reg. 1681/79, supra note 4, art. 2 (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 4, § 2).
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Historically, the factors most frequently relied upon by the Commission to
impose antidumping duties were:
1. a price level for the imported products which was slightly below the
EEC's price;
2. an increase in imports:
e cycle chains (Taiwan): increased by fifteen percent"
e ferrochromium (South Africa, Sweden): increased by forty-five per-
cent42
0 kraft liner (U.S.A.): increased by seventy to eighty percent' 3
3. a decrease in the EEC's production.
Besides the establishment of dumping and injury, a third condition has to
be met before the Commission or Council can levy duties: "The interest of
the EEC should call for EEC intervention."" The concept of EEC interest
covers a wide range of factors including consumer's interest, the interests of
the producers of the product and the necessity to maintain competition in the
EEC.41
III. Refinements in Procedure
An important safeguard for parties charged with dumping are the new
rules concerning their right to be informed and to due process. This is mainly
a consequence of the Court decision in the Japanese Roller Bearings Case. In
short, a dumping proceeding is initiated either by the filing of a complaint by
an EEC individual or industry, or, in the absence of a complaint, by a direct
communication by a Member State to the Commission.' 6 As of yet, all of the
proceedings have been opened by the filing of a complaint.
When a complaint is filed, it is examined to insure that there is sufficient
prima facie evidence of dumping and of material injury or threat thereof.
When aprimafacie case has been established, the Commission takes over the
full investigation following publication of a notice in the Official Journal.'7
The Commission has broad investigatory powers both within and outside
the EEC. It may hold hearings in which the parties directly concerned-the
complainant, the exporters and importers of the product in question, and the
official representatives of the exporting country-present their written or
verbal opinions. Alternatively, the Commission may organize adversary
hearings at which the parties may present their arguments and be cross-
examined.' 8
"Council Reg. 316/77, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 45) 4 (1977).
"'Council Reg. 1355/78, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 165) 20 (1978).
"Council Reg. 572/79, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 77) 1 (1979).
"Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 15, § 1 (a).
"DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS, EEC COMMISSION, GUIDANCE FOR APPLI-
CANTS SEEKING ACTION AGAINST DUMPED OR SUBSIDISED IMPORTS (Jan. II, 1978).
"Reg. 459/68, supra note 3 art. 6.
"Id., art. 10, §§ 1, 2.
"Id., art. 10, § 6 (a, b).
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This latter method has been used in most cases so far. Under the former
rule, the Commission had limited the parties' access to information and
refused to disclose either the details of the dumping margin calculation or the
motive for its findings."9 It took the view that imposition of dumping duties
was a matter of regulation (antidumping duties are imposed pursuant to a
Council Regulation),"0 and that restricting the scope of cross-examination
was a matter of legislative discretion." However, under the pressure of the
Court of Justice decision in the Japanese Roller Bearings Case, the rules have
been modified in order to better preserve the right of a party's access to
information used against him. 2 Regulation 1681/79 provides that the parties
concerned may obtain information relating to any essential facts or consider-
ations that might prompt the Commission to recommend definitive
measures." The parties are requested to address their detailed questions to
the Commission in writing, not later than one month after the publication of
the notice of initiation of the proceeding, or, in the case where a temporary
duty has been imposed, within two weeks from the date of publication of the
duty's imposition."' Regulation 1681/79 provides that the requested infor-
mation may be given either orally or in writing, at the Commission's discre-
tion."
IV. Outcomes of Proceeding
At the time of the investigation of a complaint by the Commission, a tem-
porary antidumping duty may be imposed if it is feared that counter action
will be taken by the exporters or if the allegedly dumped imports have already
obtained a substantial share of the market and are rapidly increasing. Thus, if
a preliminary examination shows that dumping has occurred, that there is
sufficient evidence of injury and that the interest of the EEC calls for immedi-
ate action, a temporary duty will be imposed." The amount of this temporary
"On the fact-finding approach used by the Commission so far, see Bellstedt, Antidum-
pingverfahren der Kommission der Europitischen Gemeinschaften, 8 RECHT DER INTERNA-
TIONAIEN W1RTSCHAFT. 534 (1979).
"Reg. 459/68, supra note 3 art. 19, § i.
"On the legal consequences of imposing antidumping duties by means of regulation, see
Lesguillons, Le RegimeAnti-Dumping de la CommunauteEuropenne, 4 INT'L TRADE L. PRAC.
502 n.35 (1978).
"See the opinion of Mr. Advocate General J.-P. Warner in the Japanese Rolling Bearing
Case, Case No. 121/77 (not yet reported).
It is a fundamental principle of Community law that, before any individual measure or
decision is taken, of such a nature as directly to affect the interests of a particular person, that
person has a right to be heard by the responsible authority; and it is part and parcel of that
principle that, in order to enable him effectively to exercise that right, the person concerned is
entitled to be informed to the facts and considerations on the basis of which the authority is
minded to act.
Id.
"Reg 1681/79, supra note 4, art. 3 (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 10, § 4 (b)).
"Reg 1681/79, supra note 4, art. 3 (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 10, § 4 (c) (aa)).
"Reg 1681/79, supra note 4, art. 3 (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 10, § 4(c) (bb)).
"Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 15, § 1.
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duty is not payable if, for instance, security in the form of a bank guaranty
can be lodged by the importers with the proper customs authorities." This
measure is valid for three months and may be renewed up to a maximum of
six months if the investigation has not been completed and the exporters and
importers who represent a substantial proportion of the litigious imports
either request or do not object to such extension.58
If no dumping or injury is found, the proceeding is terminated. In such
case, the Commission submits a report to the Council who in turn approves
the proposition and the proceeding is ended.59
The proceeding may also be closed if the exporter undertakes to cease
dumping, that is, agrees to raise his prices or ceases to export the product in
question to the EEC, provided that the Commission, after hearing from the
ad hoc Antidumping Committee, finds these actions sufficient.6 Difficulties
may arise if a settlement agreement to raise prices or to stop exports is not
complied with by the exporter. For this reason, the Commission is entitled to
control the exports and to monitor compliance with the settlement agree-
ment.6 ' Also, if the obligation of the exporters is being evaded or no longer
observed, the Commission, after informing the Member States, is entitled to
reopen the file and, after a new examination of the facts, to impose a provi-
sional duty immediately.6 '
An important issue in the Japanese Roller Bearings Case concerned the
legality of imposing a definitive antidumping duty in spite of a voluntary
undertaking signed on July 19, 1977 by the four major Japanese producers
that obligated the producers to revise their prices in order to eliminate the
dumping margin. (This undertaking resulted in an increase of twenty percent
in their export prices.)
Despite this voluntary agreement, the Council issued a regulation on July
26, 1977:63
1. To impose a definitive antidumping duty of fifteen percent on the prod-
ucts in question and to suspend the application of such duty;
2. To provide a right for the Commission to terminate the suspension of
the duty application if it finds that the undertaking assumed by the
Japanese producers is being evaded, not being observed or has been
withdrawn;
3. To provide for the definitive collection of the amounts secured by way
of a temporary antidumping duty previously imposed.
"Lesguillons, supra note 51, at 500.
"Reg. 1681/79, supra note 4, art. 5 (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 16, § 2.
"Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 14, § I (a).
6"Reg 1681/79, supra note 4, art. 4 (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 14, § 2).
6'See how the Commission exercised its control right on the imports into the EEC of bicycle
tires and tubes from South Korea and Taiwan. Comm. Dec. 77/710, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
292) - (1977), as extended by Comm. Dec. 79/31, 22 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 9) - (1979).
2Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 14, § 2 (d).
'Reg. 1778/77, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 196) - (1977).
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The Court decided that the Council's decision was a clear violation of
Regulation 459/68, article 17. It held that since an undertaking by an im-
porter to revise his prices leads to the termination of the proceeding, it is
impossible thereafter to apply article 17 of the Regulation, which provides
for the collection of amounts secured by way of temporary duty. The Court
voided Council Regulation no. 1778/77. Regulation 1681/79 now contains
the statutory basis for retaining a temporary antidumping duty should there
be similar cases.
64
The power to retain temporary duties already levied independent from any
decision by the Council to impose a definitive antidumping duty, has been
reinforced in the redraft of article 17. It now provides that, when a temporary
duty has been applied, the Council shall be free to decide, "irrespective of
whether a definitive antidumping duty is to be imposed, what proportion of
the temporary duty is to be definitely collected." Of course, any definitive
collection signifies that either material injury and dumping have been es-
tablished or that EEC industries would have suffered such injury had the
temporary action not been taken.
This new possibility to definitely collect the amounts secured by way of a
temporary duty after a voluntary undertaking to revise the prices has been
concluded is important since the Commission has exhibited a distinct prefer-
ence for such settlements. The number of cases where a definitive antidump-
ing duty has been imposed is small (only thirteen cases up until August 1979,
including those cases where the duties were thereafter annulled or sus-
pended).
V. Recourses
Another question raised in the Japanese Roller Bearings Case was how and
when to defeat a measure taken in an antidumping matter. The recourse
provided in Regulation 459/68 was very limited and has been narrowed even
further in Regulation 1681/79.65 This recourse is reserved solely to the im-
porter and does not permit questioning of the legality of a measure.
Regulation 459/68 expressly provided the possibility for an importer to
show that no dumping had taken place. The consequence being that, if
successful, he had the chance to recover the entire antidumping duty. Regula-
tion 1681/79 provides that an importer can only recover the amount of duty
in excess of the actual dumping margin if he can show that the collected duty
exceeded such margin.
Another recourse that was pursued in the Japanese Roller Bearings Case
was the annulment proceeding based on article 173 of the Treaty of Rome.
According to this provision, any person may institute a proceeding against "a
decision addressed to him or against a decision which, although in the form
14Reg 1681/79, supra note 4, art. 6 (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 17, § 2 (a)).
"Reg 1681/79, supra note 4, art. 7 (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 19, § 4 (a)).
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of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and
individual concern to him." The limited applicability of this recourse when
applied to antidumping proceedings results from the fact that antidumping
measures, such as the imposition of a duty, are taken by virtue of Council
regulations," and thus reliance on the annulment recourse requires a showing
that the antidumping measure was an actual "decision in the form of a regu-
lation." In the Japanese Roller Bearings Case, the Court ruled that the liti-
gious regulation did not contain the normative features inherent to regula-
tions and, in fact, was a real "decision" directed to four exporters and
importers specifically designated:
Thus, although drafted in general terms, article 1 (of Regulation 1778/77) in fact
concerns only the situation of the major Japanese producers . . who are directly
and individually concerned by reason of the undertakings which they have given to
revise their prices .... 6 Although, the collection of the amounts secured by way of
temporary antidumping duty is per se of direct concern to any importer who has
imported the products in question subject to such a duty, the special feature of
article 3 (of Regulation 1778/77) which sets it apart from all the other articles is that
it does not concern all importers but only those who have imported the products
manufactured by the four major Japanese producers named in that article. 6
As mentioned earlier, the Commission is increasingly engaged in anti-
dumping proceedings involving a variety of products. In the past, there were
no more than six or seven antidumping proceedings opened each year; now,
this number has soared substantially and further developments in this area
are expected, primarily as a result of the GATT multilateral trade negotia-
tions. 9
From January through June 1979, the break down per country for pro-
ceedings opened by the Commission is as follows: Spain, 14; Czechoslovakia,
10; Poland and Rumania, 9; Japan and East Germany, 8; the Soviet Union,
6; Hungary, the United States, and Canada, 5; Bulgaria, Sweden, and Brazil,
4; Australia, South Korea, and Finland, 3; South Africa, Austria, and
Greece, 2; Portugal, Norway, Yugoslavia and Turkey, 1.
The ever-increasing application of antidumping measures showed that the
basic Regulation 459/68 had many weaknesses and needed to be more
sharply defined. The new Regulation 1681/79 is supposed to fill the gaps and
permit the Common Market to deal more effectively with dumping. Its future
application by the EEC will prove whether or not this requirement has been
satisfied.
66Reg. 1681/79, supra note 4, art. 7 (amending Reg. 459/68, supra note 3, art. 19, § 4 (a)).
"See Nippon Seiko K.K. v. Council, Case No. 119/77, § 3.
"Id. § 14.
"See the last paragraph to the Preamble, Reg 1681/79, supra note 4. Whereas the EEC's new
legislation seems to meet much of the GATT antidumping provisions and, therefore, will not
need extensive modification in the future, some GATT members are faced with some fundamen-
tal legislation work. For example, Canada still proves to be deficient in implementing the Anti-
dumping Code requirements with respect to the right to information and representation and the
faculty to enter into price undertakings. (Antidumping Code arts. 6, 7).
